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CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING JUVENILES—WHERE DO WE GO FROM
HERE? MANDATORY SENTENCING AND RETROACTIVE APPLICATION POSTMILLER. MILLER V. ALABAMA, 132 S. CT. 2455 (2012).
I. INTRODUCTION
“There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in
which it treats its children.”1 It is even more telling when looking at the way
society punishes its children. The stories of Kuntrell and Evan described
below demonstrate the importance of allowing a court to consider mitigating
circumstances when sentencing the nation’s youth.
Kuntrell,2 age fourteen, and his older friends were out one night when
they decided to rob a video store. On their way, Kuntrell learned that one of
his friends, Derek, was carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Kuntrell initially
stayed outside of the store, but later, after seeing Derek point the gun at the
store clerk, went inside and said, “I thought you all was playin’.” After the
clerk threatened to call the police, Derek shot the clerk, killing her.
Evan, age fourteen, and a friend went to the home of his mother’s drug
dealer, Cole, to smoke marijuana and play drinking games. After Cole
passed out, Evan attempted to steal his money. Cole awoke and grabbed
Evan. Evan, who had reached for a bat, started to strike Cole repeatedly.
After several blows, Evan put a sheet over Cole’s head and said “I am God;
I’ve come to take your life,” and struck him again. Evan and his friend left
but later returned to set Cole’s home on fire to cover up the crime.
In both cases, the lower courts were unable to consider any mitigating
factor, such as age, which resulted in both of these boys receiving the exact
same sentence as anyone else who committed these offenses: mandatory life
without parole.3 The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
mandatory portion of both boys’ sentences in Miller v. Alabama4 and required that mitigating factors be taken into account in these cases. The Court
found that the lack of discretion in sentencing violated the Eighth Amend1. Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, Speech at the launch of the Nelson
Mandela Children’s Fund (May 8, 1995) (transcript available at http://db.nelsonmandela.org/
speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS250&txtstr=Mahlamba).
2. The following factual scenarios are taken from the real crimes committed by
Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller, defendants in the consolidated Supreme Court case, Miller
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). For more detail about their initial prosecutions, see
Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011); Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676 (Ala.
2010).
3. See generally Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103; Miller v. State, 63
So. 3d 676 (Ala. 2010).
4. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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ment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.5 The Court explained
that judges must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
when sentencing juvenile offenders facing life without parole.6
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has distinguished between
juveniles and adults in terms of appropriate sentencing practices.7 Although
many people may believe that a juvenile offender who committed a serious
crime deserves an equally harsh punishment as an adult,8 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly based its juvenile jurisprudence on the notion that children by
their very nature are inherently less culpable than adults, even when they
commit heinous crimes.9
In light of the “children are different” analysis relied upon by the Supreme Court in cases involving juvenile offenders,10 this note proposes that
the Miller v. Alabama Supreme Court decision did not go far enough for two
reasons. First, mandatory sentencing of juvenile offenders, as a whole, is
unsupported by the Eighth Amendment.11 Second, the rule in Miller warrants retroactive application in order to prevent previous juvenile offenders
from serving what are now unconstitutional sentences.12
The next section, Part II, briefly explains the cases leading up to Miller
and highlights the important factors that the Supreme Court of the United
States considers when determining whether an adult sentence is appropriate
for a child. Part III.A explains the negative impacts of mandatory sentences
and argues that the analysis in Miller supports a complete ban on all mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders. Part III.B considers the jurisdictional
split on whether Miller warrants retroactive application and argues for the
importance of giving a retroactive effect to the ruling. Finally, the note concludes in Part IV.
5. Id. at 2469.
6. Id.
7. For cases where the Supreme Court has made this distinction, see generally Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
8. The author recognizes that any leniency on a criminal defendant can be controversial; however, the Supreme Court of the United States has based its standard on scientific fact
and common sense, which supports the conclusion that children who commit crimes are “less
deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2464 (quoting Graham, 506
U.S. at 68).
9. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (banning life without parole for juveniles convicted of
non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (extending the ban on capital punishment for
juveniles to the age of eighteen); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (banning capital punishment for
juveniles under the age of sixteen).
10. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
11. See id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority opinion’s
distinction between sentencing children and adults supports the proposition that mandatory
sentences for juveniles could be barred altogether).
12. Hill v. Synder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013).
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II. BACKGROUND
Juvenile offenders are capable of committing truly heinous crimes;13
however, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the inherent nature of
youth makes juveniles less culpable and more deserving of special consideration.14 Miller v. Alabama is the most recent case in a series of cases restricting sentences that can be applied to juvenile offenders.15 In each case, the
Court considered various factors to justify a different punishment for the
same offense based on the age of the offender. This section focuses on the
cases that came before Miller and the analysis the Supreme Court relies upon to explain why kids are inherently different.
A.

The Cases

In 1988, the landscape of juvenile jurisprudence changed when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Thompson v. Oklahoma.16 In that
decision, the Court eliminated capital punishment as a possible sentence for
an individual who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense.17
The defendant, William Wayne Thompson, who was fifteen at the time,
brutally murdered Thompson’s brother-in-law with the help of three other
individuals.18 Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first-degree
murder, and sentenced to death.19 The Supreme Court overturned Thompson’s sentence and held that executing a person who was under sixteen at
the time of the offense was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.20
Following Thompson, the Supreme Court again limited the possible
sentences for juvenile criminal offenders in Roper v. Simmons21 by banning
the death penalty for anyone under the age of eighteen.22 Simmons was seventeen at the time he broke into his victim’s home and brutally murdered
13. For example, the defendant in Roper v. Simmons, who was seventeen at the time of
his crime, kidnapped his victim out of her home, wrapped her face in duct tape and her hands
in electrical wire before throwing her over a bridge to drown. 543 U.S. at 556–57.
14. Miller, 132 S. Ct at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010)).
15. See Graham, 560 U.S at 82 (banning life without parole for juveniles convicted of
non-homicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (extending the ban on capital punishment for
juveniles to the age of eighteen); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (banning
capital punishment for juveniles under the age of sixteen).
16. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
17. Id. at 823.
18. Id. at 819. The victim, who suffered from multiple gunshot wounds, cuts on his
torso, bruises, and a broken leg, was also abandoned in a river chained to concrete. Id.
19. Id. at 819–20.
20. Id. at 838.
21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22. Id. at 568.
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her.23 The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree and recommended the death penalty.24 Simmons’s initial appeals were denied, but after
Atkins v. Virginia,25 the Supreme Court of Missouri replaced Simmons’s
death sentence with life without parole.26 The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed this decision and limited eligibility for the death penalty to
those who were over the age of eighteen at the time of their offense.27
The next major development came in 2010 with Graham v. Florida.28
In Graham, the defendant violated his probation by participating in a home
invasion with two older accomplices.29 As a result, the trial court sentenced
Graham to life without parole for his earlier crime of armed burglary.30 Focusing on proportionality, however, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits sentencing a juvenile
convicted of a non-homicide crime to life without parole.31
Finally, in 2012, the Court decided Miller v. Alabama.32 This case
reached the Supreme Court after it granted certiorari in two state supreme
court decisions.33 In the cases below, defendants, Kuntrell Jackson and Evan
Miller, each challenged his own mandatory sentence of life without parole.34
Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen years old when he was involved in an attempted robbery that resulted in the death of a video store clerk.35 Kuntrell
was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery.36 Under Arkansas
law at that time, the charge of felony murder was subject to a mandatory
sentence of life without parole,37 meaning that, in the event of a conviction,
the judge had no choice but to sentence the offender to life without parole.
23. Id. at 556–57. For a more detailed description of Simmons’s crime, see supra text
accompanying note 13.
24. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
25. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of the mentally retarded was prohibited
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
26. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60.
27. Id. at 560, 568.
28. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
29. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 53–55 (2010).
30. Id. at 57.
31. Id. at 74.
32. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
33. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461–63 (2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2461.
36. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed his convictions in Jackson v. State, 359
Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757.
37. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(c) (Repl. 1997). But now, post-Miller, subsection (c)
has been severed as applied to juveniles, and capital murder is now considered a Class Y
felony subject to a discretionary sentence of between ten and forty years or life. Jackson v.
Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, at 7–8, 426 S.W.3d 906, 910; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(c)(1)(B)
(Supp. 2013).
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Evan Miller was also fourteen years old at the time of his crime.38 Evan
was convicted of murder in the course of arson after he attempted to rob a
man, beat him nearly to death, and then set his home on fire to destroy the
evidence.39 Evan’s conviction was also subject to a mandatory sentence of
life without parole.40
Considering both of these cases, the Court decided that the “mandatory” portion of the sentence was unconstitutional because the trial judge must
grant juvenile offenders the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating
circumstances before they are sentenced.41 In making this decision, the
Court continued to rely on the “kids are different” analysis from the cases
listed above and eliminated mandatory life without parole as an option for
sentencing a juvenile offender.42
The Court focused on the fact that the mandatory requirement prohibits
the judge from considering the mitigating factors of youth such as age,
background, and mental and emotional development.43
Under these [mandatory] schemes, every juvenile will receive the same
sentence as every other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child
from a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile (including
these two 14-year-olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses—but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve.44

Without discretionary authority, the offender who, like Kuntrell Jackson, is merely an accomplice to a felony murder will be subject to the same
mandatory penalty as the offender who pulled the trigger.45 Equally telling, a
child like Evan Miller, who was physically abused, suicidal, and neglected
by his drug-addicted mother,46 will suffer the same punishment as an adult,
who was instilled with a better sense of right and wrong simply due to age.
In each of the above cases, the defendant committed a serious offense, yet

38. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
39. Id. at 2462–63.
40. Id. at 2463 (citing ALA. CODE. ANN. §§ 13A-5-40(9), 13A-6-2(c) (1982)).
41. Id. at 2469.
42. Id. Note that a juvenile may still receive life without parole for a non-homicide
crime, but the distinction that the Court makes here is that the sentence cannot be mandatory.
Id. Instead, a sentencer must “take into account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id.
43. Id. at 2467.
44. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68 (emphasis in original).
45. See id. at 2468.
46. Id. at 2469.
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the Supreme Court overturned each sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds
based on important fundamental differences between children and adults.47
B.

General Differences Between Children and Adults

As Justice Powell explained, “the experience of mankind, as well as the
long history of our law, recogniz[es] that there are differences[,] which must
be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared with those of adults.”48 Distinctions based on age are prevalent in our
current legal system. For example, in all fifty states individuals under the
age of eighteen are not allowed to marry without parental consent, vote, or
sit on a jury.49 Compared to adults, children lack experience, education, and
generally some level of intelligence, which makes them more susceptible to
peer pressure and less likely to consider the possible consequences of their
actions.50
In Roper v. Simmons and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court recognized three fundamental differences between adults and children.51 First, it
addressed how juveniles are generally less mature and responsible than their
adult counterparts.52 Second, the Court acknowledged that juveniles are
more susceptible to peer pressure.53 Third, the Court pointed out that a
child’s character is not fully formed, and thus, can be reshaped over time.54
These fundamental differences were the basis for the Court’s conclusion that
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”55
These same rules also justify a complete ban on mandatory sentencing
as a whole and support an argument for applying Miller retroactively. The
mitigating qualities of youth that distinguish children from adults, and upon
which the court relies in making their decisions, are not newly developed.56
47. Id. at 2464.
48. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 590–91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
49. See id. (discussing, specifically, the legal distinctions between children and adults in
Oklahoma).
50. Id. at 835. “Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.” Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635
(1979)).
51. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
52. Id. at 569.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 570.
55. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
56. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (relying on science and sociological studies, and the
experience of parents, to support the notion that juveniles lack the maturity and sense of
responsibility of adults).
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Children will often have some mitigating circumstance that courts may need
to take into account when assigning a punishment, particularly in the context
of accomplishing the penological goals discussed in the next section.
C.

Penological Goals

In addition to examining why children are fundamentally different
from adults, the Court also considered whether a particular punishment of a
juvenile will accomplish any of the four penological goals.57 The four goals
are deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution.58 The first three
goals have utilitarian purposes, which reflect society’s hope to achieve a
benefit from the punishment.59 In contrast, the fourth goal—retributivism—
is more concerned with payback.60
Deterrence is intended to prevent crime by creating a fear of the punishment.61 Juveniles, however, are generally less likely than adults to consider the future consequences of their actions.62 When compared with adults,
juveniles are less likely to be deterred from a particular crime based on the
punishment, and therefore, deterrence typically provides a less adequate
justification for a particular punishment.63 As the Supreme Court explained,
“[c]rimes committed by youths may be just as harmful to victims as those
committed by older persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in longrange terms than adults.”64

57. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–74 (2010) (considering life without parole
for juvenile non-homicide crimes against the goals of retribution, incapacitation, deterrence,
and rehabilitation).
58. Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).
59. Id. at 1316.
60. Id. at 1315–16.
61. Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 544 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., 2014).
There are two forms of deterrence: general and specific. Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 108 (2010). General deterrence aims to reduce overall crime by
targeting future offenders; specific deterrence aims to deter a particular offender from repeating the offense. Id.
62. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (explaining that juveniles, who are
immature, reckless, and impetuous, are generally less likely to consider potential punishments); accord Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (explaining that juveniles are less likely to be deterred from a crime for the same reasons that make them less culpable than adults).
63. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (finding that deterrence did not justify the punishment at
issue in the case); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005) (finding also that
deterrence did not justify the punishment at issue in the case).
64. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115 n.11 (1982)).
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Like deterrence, incapacitation is a means of preventing offenders from
returning to criminal activity.65 The Supreme Court recognized in Graham
and Roper that “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.”66
On the other hand, rehabilitation, the third goal of punishment, is intended to help the criminal become a productive member of society.67 “[I]t
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult,
for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”68 Because juveniles have the capacity to change,69 juvenile offenders have more potential to be rehabilitated,70 a factor courts consider in
juvenile punishment.
Retribution differs from the previous goals of punishment because instead of simply trying to prevent crime, the purpose of retribution is to elicit
repayment or enact revenge upon the offender.71 Retribution also focuses on
the offender’s culpable state of mind.72 As recognized by society and the
Supreme Court, however, juveniles generally have a less culpable state of
mind, which means that the justification for retribution is not as strong when
dealing with children.73
D.

Objective Indicia of the National Consensus

When distinguishing between appropriate sentences for children and
adults, in some cases, the Court considers whether there is a national consensus for or against a certain punishment.74 In Thompson, the Court recognized that all states had enacted legislation differentiating between criminal
defendants sixteen and older and those younger than sixteen,75 which justified the Court’s decision to ban the death penalty for individuals under the
65. Cotton, supra note 58, at 1316. Statistics show that sixty-seven percent of adult
offenders released from state prison will become repeat offenders within three years. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003)).
66. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
67. Cotton, supra note 58, at 1316–17.
68. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
69. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
70. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (discussing the briefs of the amici curiae, which explain that
juvenile offenders are more receptive to rehabilitation).
71. Retribution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1511 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed., 2014).
72. Ryan, supra note 61, at 102–03.
73. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
74. Ryan, supra note 61, at 87.
75. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823–24. At that time, eighteen states had completely abolished the death penalty for individuals under sixteen. Id. at 829.
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age of sixteen.76 In Roper, the Supreme Court followed similar reasoning in
determining that eighteen was the more appropriate dividing line for capital
punishment.77
As part of this analysis, a court may also take into account outside
sources, such as how frequently the judgment is imposed as well as public
or professional opinion.78 In Graham, the Court looked at actual sentencing
practices, not just statutory schemes.79 Just under 125 juvenile offenders
nationwide were actually serving sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide crimes in 2010.80 Because the sentence had actually been applied
relatively few times, the Court concluded that the nation was generally
against it.81
The Supreme Court also acknowledged that medical research indicates
children’s brains are fundamentally different from adults’ brains.82 Science
shows that only a small portion of children who participate in illegal activities will continue that pattern into their adult lives.83 Based on society’s
views and the views of the scientific community, the Court established that
scientific and professional opinion support the Court’s conclusion that children are different from adults and those differences need to be taken into
account during sentencing.84
E.

Applying the Precedents in Miller

“An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal
procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all
would be flawed.”85 In deciding Miller, the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court relied heavily on the analysis of its previous decisions in Graham and
Roper.86 The Court recapped the fundamental differences between children
and adults, and the scientific evidence that supports this distinction.87 The

76. Id. at 838.
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
78. Ryan, supra note 61, at 87.
79. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
80. Id. at 64.
81. See id. at 67 (explaining that the practice of sentencing juveniles to life without
parole for a non-homicide crime was “exceedingly rare”).
82. Id. at 68.
83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
84. Id. at 2469.
85. Graham, 540 U.S. at 76.
86. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–69.
87. Id. at 2464–65.

320

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Court also discussed the penological justifications in relation to a mandatory
sentence of life without parole.88
In each of these cases, the Court consistently pointed out that juvenile
offenders are inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts, and
therefore, are entitled to more particularized attention when it comes to sentencing.89 It follows that the same mitigating qualities in which the Court
relies on to invalidate the mandatory aspect of sentencing a juvenile to life
without parole are applicable to any mandatory sentence imposed upon a
juvenile offender. Further, mitigating qualities are also relevant to cases in
which juveniles were sentenced with mandatory life without parole prior to
this decision.
III. ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States limited its holding in Miller v.
Alabama to mandatory sentences of life without parole.90 This limitation
fails to acknowledge that the analysis supporting the holding may equally
apply to juveniles subjected to any mandatory sentence.91 The opinion also
leaves open the question of retroactive application of the holding.92 The following sections discuss these two issues and argue that the next steps are
(A) prohibition of all mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders, and (B)
retroactive application of Miller.
A.

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders is Inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s Approach in Miller

Mandatory minimum sentencing schemes are an unnecessary evil in
our criminal system,93 particularly when applied to juvenile offenders. This
form of sentencing reemerged in our jurisprudence at a time when the
American public was under the impression that crime rates were rising and

88. Id. at 2465.
89. See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–69.
90. Id. at 2469.
91. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
92. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1024 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012) (Sterba
J., concurring) (recognizing that the Court did not announce whether the rule applied retroactively as required by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)).
93. See Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 103 (2009) (arguing that a presumptive penalty, as opposed to a mandatory penalty, would actually achieve the goals of mandatory sentences without the negative side effects).

2015]

SENTENCING JUVENILES

321

lawmakers wanted to appear “tough on crime.”94 Mandatory sentences have
been established for various crimes, ranging from drug offenses to economic
crimes to more serious offenses, such as homicide.95
Because many jurisdictions transfer juvenile offenders to the adult
court system, juveniles are also subject to the same adult sentences.96 The
nature of mandatory minimums, however, completely undermines the Supreme Court’s “children are different” approach to sentencing.97 This section
argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller and the other Eighth
Amendment cases, although currently limited to the harshest punishments in
our society,98 should be extended to outlaw mandatory minimum sentences
for juveniles across the board.
The following section briefly explains the history of mandatory minimums before turning to an analysis of why this form of sentencing simply
does not work, even in the context of adults. The final section explains why
the Supreme Court’s approach to sentencing juveniles leads to the conclusion that these sentences impose an unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual
punishment”99 on juvenile offenders.
1.

A Brief History of Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Mandatory sentences have been a part of the American criminal justice
system since the late 1700s, when capital punishment was mandated for
serious offenses such as murder or treason.100 In the second half of the twentieth century, Congress began to change its perception of mandatory minimum penalties by enacting them more frequently, applying them to more
crimes, and lengthening the mandatory sentences.101 Public support for man94. Karen Lutjen, Note, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 389, 394 (1996).
95. For a full list see Charles Doyle, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes,
CONG. RES. SERV. 101–16 (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32
040.pdf.
96. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 139 (2005) (explaining that
although every American jurisdiction has a separate court in which to try juvenile offenders,
every jurisdiction has also created exceptions allowing for transfer to adult court under specified circumstances).
97. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
98. Id. at 2475 (“[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
100. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the
Federal Criminal Justice System 7 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative
_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penaltie
s/20111031_RtC_PDF/Chapter_02.pdf.
101. Id. at 22.
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datory sentences saw another resurgence in the 1980s, particularly for drug
related offenses.102
These ebbs and flows resulted from a misguided public belief that
overall crime rates were increasing, including crimes committed by juveniles.103 This perception was largely due to media influence.104 In-depth coverage and media attention given to violent crimes, such as the Columbine
shooting, left the public believing that heinous acts like these were a symbol
of continuing youth violence.105
In addition, there was also a “widespread perception that young people
[would] not behave unless the punishment for wrongdoing [was] severe.”106
Therefore, juveniles were transferred to adult court where they were subject
to the same mandatory minimums applied to adult offenders,107 without any
consideration of their age, background, or other mitigating factors. Instead
of giving the child a reason not to commit a crime, the child was treated the
same as an, arguably, more culpable adult offender.108
2.

Mandatory Minimums Do Not Satisfy Their Intended Goals

When mandatory minimums were enacted, proponents thought that
they would assure evenhandedness, transparency, and crime prevention.109
This did not turn out to be the case; in fact, in most instances, the opposite
occurred.110 Overall, “[m]andatory penalties are a bad idea.”111 They do not
aid society in accomplishing its penological goal of deterrence112 and have
actually increased the prison population.113
A convicted criminal may face a harsh mandatory penalty based on one
aggravating circumstance.114 Because of the statutory nature of mandatory

102. Id. at 23.
103. JULIAN V. ROBERTS ET AL., PENAL POPULISM AND PUBLIC OPINION: LESSONS FROM
FIVE COUNTRIES 107 (2003).
104. Id. at 111.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 109.
107. ZIMRING, supra note 96, at 139.
108. See ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 103, at 109 (explaining that giving a child a reason
not to commit a crime is more effective than giving the child a more severe punishment).
109. Tonry, supra note 93, at 67.
110. See id. at 67–68 (explaining that in practice judges and prosecutors sometimes circumvent mandatory penalties, which ultimately leads to unjust results).
111. Id. at 100.
112. Id. at 68.
113. LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
MANDATORY SENTENCING 151 (1994).
114. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness
of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 66 (1993) (arguing that both deter-
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minimums, sometimes only one or two factors will be taken into account
during sentencing.115 For example, some crimes can have a “tariff-like” effect in which anyone who commits a particular crime will receive a particular sentence without any consideration of that person’s level of culpability or
any other mitigating factor.116 One former Philadelphia judge felt that “trial
judges are far better situated than any other professionals to see the often
tragic consequences of the decisions the law impels.”117
Nevertheless, proponents urged that this type of punishment would deter both future and repeat offenders.118 Mandatory sentences, however, have
not been proven to have a deterrent effect, except in minor crimes like
speeding.119 Further, it is unlikely an immature juvenile offender, with generally less culpability, will be deterred by a mandatory sentence any more
than a discretionary sentence for any particular crime.120
Not only has mandatory sentencing failed to deter criminals, but it has
also actually led to an increase in the prison population.121 The United States
prison population is increasing at one of the highest rates in the world.122
From 1970 to present, the prison population in the United States increased
from only about 200,000 prisoners to about 1.4 million prisoners.123 The
most common mandatory minimum sentence is five years for a non-violent
crime.124 The financial costs to society are significant,125 but the social costs
are even greater, because the inmate is released and still unable to function
in society, absent some form of rehabilitation.126

minate and mandatory sentencing schemes lead to just as much disparity in sentencing as
indeterminate schemes).
115. Lutjen, supra note 94, at 402.
116. Id. at 401.
117. FORER, supra note 113, at 14. Judge Forer left the bench after being forced to implement a mandatory five-year sentence on an offender who had repaid the $50.00 he had
stolen while holding up a taxi with a toy pistol and had rehabilitated himself in the five years
following his conviction. Id. at 2–4.
118. See Lutjen, supra note 94, at 395 (explaining that both special and general deterrence were purposes promoted for mandatory minimums).
119. Tonry, supra note 93, at 68.
120. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) (finding that juveniles are generally
less susceptible to deterrence).
121. See FORER, supra note 113, at 151 (describing how mandatory sentencing causes
prison overcrowding).
122. Id. at 1.
123. The Editorial Board, Why Prisons Are Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/why-prisons-are-shrinking.html?r=0.
124. FORER, supra note 113, at 153.
125. Id. (explaining that about twenty years ago it would have costed society about
$175,000 to incarcerate one inmate for five years).
126. Id.
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Mandatory Minimums and Miller

The analysis used to reverse the mandatory sentence in Miller, and the
other cases described above, is applicable to all mandatory sentences for
juveniles.127 In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that the
analysis used to strike down sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenders was not limited to just those crimes, or even “crimespecific.”128 The Court then applied that same analysis, from Roper and
Graham, to strike down mandatory life without parole in Miller.129
Justice Roberts noted in his dissent that “[t]here is no clear reason that
principle [behind today’s decision] would not bar all mandatory sentences
for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated
adult would receive.”130 The majority in Miller also recognized that an appropriate sentence for an adult might not be appropriate for a child.131
Although the opinions provided by the Court in Roper, Graham, and
Miller have considered harsh punishments such as the death penalty and life
without parole, the underlying principle of these decisions points to the fact
that children need individualized sentencing.132 “Such mandatory penalties,
by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s
age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”133
Holding a juvenile to the same standard of an adult directly contradicts the
analysis supporting these decisions, because it ignores the entire premise
upon which the holding is based—kids are inherently different from
adults.134

127. See Craig S. Lerner, Sentenced to Confusion: Miller v. Alabama and the Coming
Wave of Eighth Amendment Cases, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 25, 31 (2012) (“And if the majority dares to follow its reasoning in Miller—that is, the need to take into account a juvenile’s peculiar characteristics before imposing punishment—to its logical culmination, all
mandatory sentences for juveniles will be prohibited.”).
128. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (relying on Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)) (“But none of what [Graham] said about children—about
their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crimespecific.”).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2470 (majority opinion).
132. See id. at 2468.
133. Id. at 2467.
134. AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS IN ADULT AND
JUVENILE COURTS 19 (2006).
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Not Applying Miller Retroactively Perpetuates the Cruelty Miller Was
Meant to Prohibit

The second major issue with the decision in Miller v. Alabama is that it
fails to specifically state that the decision applies retroactively, leading to a
split of authority among courts. Some jurisdictions have held that under
Teague v. Lane,135 Miller presents a new rule and, thus, applies retroactively.136 But in other jurisdictions,137 the approximately 2,000 prisoners currently serving mandatory sentences of life without parole for crimes committed
as a juvenile138 are not entitled to collateral review of their sentences. The
following section explains the Teague standard and then examines both
sides of the jurisdictional split. Finally, it concludes with an argument as to
why retroactive application of the Miller decision is the more favorable approach.
1.

The Teague Standard

Every Supreme Court decision has lasting consequences not only for
the parties involved, but also for Americans who may face the same or similar issues in the future. In the early 1900s, all new Supreme Court decisions
were retroactively applied to civil cases that were still directly appealable
and any criminal case under a writ of habeas corpus.139 In 1965, the Supreme
Court restricted the broad retroactive application of its decisions.140 This
change ultimately led to the rule described in Teague v. Lane, which is still
applied today.141

135. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
136. See, e.g., People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
137. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Ponton,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021, at *20 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013); Martin v. Symmes, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965, at *51 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); Falcon v. State, 111 So.3d 973,
973 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013).
138. See Susan Haigh, States Revisit Mandatory Sentences for Juveniles, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 18, 2013, 1:13PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/states-revisit-mandatorysentences-juveniles (describing the story of Nicholas Aponte who was sentenced to thirty
eight years without parole in 1995 after being convicted of a felony murder committed at the
age of seventeen).
139. 1 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.11(a) (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the
evolution of retroactive application).
140. Id. (explaining that Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), changed the way
courts viewed retroactive application in future cases). Because the Court was able to hold that
some rules did not have to be applied retroactively, it was able to make significant changes to
criminal procedure without concern for the costs or other administrative problems that resulted from the original rule. Id.
141. Id.
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Generally, if a Supreme Court decision implements a new constitutional rule, it is only applicable to the present case and cases that are still being
considered on direct review.142 Under Teague, however, there are two exceptions.143 The first exception applies to new rules that change the status of
previously illegal conduct by making it legal or prevent a category of punishments for a certain group of defendants based on status or the offense
committed.144 The second exception applies to “watershed rules of criminal
procedure.”145 This exception has been very narrowly construed, with only
one case ever meeting its high standard.146
The first exception, however, has been frequently applied in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.147 Decisions that have
been applied retroactively, such as Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons, typically involve substantive rather than procedural rules.148 The rule
in Miller, although predicated on the Eighth Amendment like Graham and
Roper, is arguably a procedural rule, because it prevents states from sentencing a juvenile to life without parole without consideration of mitigating circumstances, but it does not bar the sentence as a whole.149 It does, however,
142. Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“adopt[ing] Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity
for cases on collateral review.”).
143. Id. at 311–14 (discussing the two exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity suggested by Justice Harlan).
144. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 416 (2004) (describing the two exceptions set out
in Teague and recognizing the limited application of the second exception).
145. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon reflection, to have
been fundamentally fair and conducted under those procedures essential to the
substance of a full hearing. However, in some situations it might be that time and
growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly
demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.
Id. (quoting Justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693–694 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
146. See State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 839–40 (La. 2013) (describing the only case to
which the second Teague exception was ever applied, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), in which the Supreme Court held that indigent offenders charged with felonies must
have the opportunity to be represented by counsel).
147. See 7 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that
the rules in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons were applied retroactively under the
first exception).
148. Id. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), banned life without parole for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide crimes, and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), outlawed
capital punishment for offenders under the age of eighteen.
149. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012); see 7 LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 28.6(e) (describing the difference between Miller and the other cases which are
retroactively applied).
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prevent a certain group of defendants—juveniles—from receiving a category of sentences, which is also arguably substantive.150 Nevertheless, the decision has received varying treatment by the lower courts as explained below.
2.

Jurisdictions in Favor of Retroactive Application

Only a few jurisdictions have held that Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively despite significant public support for retroactive application.151 As
one commentator asserts, “[t]he Constitution was meant to provide justice
for all—not justice according to the date of application.”152 In at least four
states, courts have held that Miller applies retroactively.153
The Appellate Court of Illinois used the Teague analysis to conclude
that Miller applies retroactively because it fits within the first exception
where “a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him.” 154 According to that court, Miller created a new substantive rule because it required a broader sentencing range.155 In addition, what may be one
of the strongest arguments for retroactive application, the appellate court
pointed out that one of the Miller defendants, Kuntrell Jackson, was before
the court on collateral review and was able to take advantage of the rule.156
Several other jurisdictions have also concluded that Miller should apply retroactively. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan applied Miller retroactively as a new substantive rule.157 The Supreme Court of Iowa also used the Teague analysis to justify applying Mil-

150. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (applying Miller
retroactively on similar grounds).
151. See, e.g., id.; Hill v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12160, *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013).
152. Redefining Justice One Year After Miller v. Alabama, JUVENILE LAW CENTER (June
27, 2013) http://www.jlc.org/blog/redefining-justice-one-year-after-miller-v-alabama.
153. Maggie Clark, After Supreme Court Ruling, States Act on Juvenile Sentences, THE
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/26/after-supreme-court-ruling-states-act-on-juvenile-sentenc
es. Iowa, Illinois, Mississippi, and the federal district court in Michigan have applied the
ruling retroactively. Id.
154. People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)); see also People v. Johnson, 998 N.E.2d 185 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2013).
155. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d at 1022.
156. Id. at 1022–23.
157. Hill v. Snyder, 2013 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12160, *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013). Although the court was considering a case on direct review, and thus, did not need to reach the
issue of collateral review, it noted that it would apply Miller retroactively as a new substantive law. Id. at *5–6 n.2.
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ler retroactively.158 The Iowa court explained that although the ruling in Miller does create a new procedure by requiring a hearing, it “is the result of a
substantive change in the law.”159 The Supreme Court of Mississippi also
found the ruling was retroactive on collateral review in Jones v. State,160
because the decision modified its substantive law.161
In In re Pendleton,162 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also
found that the petitioners seeking to file habeas corpus petitions were eligible to do so under the new Miller rule.163 The court accepted the petitioner’s
prima facie case that the rule could apply retroactively on three possible
grounds.164 First, the Supreme Court had already applied the rule retroactively to Kuntrell Jackson, who was before the Supreme Court on collateral review.165 Second, the rule falls under the first Teague exception as a new substantive rule. Third, the rule is a watershed procedural rule under the second
Teague exception.166
Most of the jurisdictions applying Miller retroactively recognize that
although the decision has a procedural effect, it mandates a substantive
change in the law for a particular group of defendants, which satisfies the
first of the Teague exceptions.167 In addition, the authorities relied upon in
Miller were applied retroactively, which indicates that Miller would logically apply retroactively as well.168 Finally, many of the courts supporting retroactive application point out that the Supreme Court has already applied the
ruling retroactively in the case of Kuntrell Jackson.169 Each of these jurisdictions provides substantial support for applying Miller retroactively, yet several jurisdictions have declined to do so, creating a split.
3.

Jurisdictions Opposed to Retroactive Application

In Louisiana, 225 offenders, who were sentenced to life without parole
as juveniles, will not have the same opportunity afforded to Kuntrell Jack-

158. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115–16 (Ia. 2013).
159. Id. (finding that the rule prevents a state from imposing a certain punishment on
certain people under the first Teague exception).
160. 122 So.3d 698 (Miss. 2013).
161. Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013).
162. 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013).
163. In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2013).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Ia. 2013).
168. See id. at 116 (“If a substantial portion of the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the same treatment.”).
169. See, e.g., id.; People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
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son to present evidence of their mitigating circumstances.170 The Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that Miller is not subject to retroactive application
on collateral review.171 Following the Teague analysis, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana concluded that Miller, as a procedural rule, did not fit under either
exception.172 Because Miller only affects the “permissible methods” through
which a state may punish a juvenile offender, it did not satisfy the first exception.173 Miller also failed to meet the high threshold of the second exception, according to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.174
Several other jurisdictions have followed this line of reasoning.175 Multiple opinions from Florida state courts indicate that the rule will not apply
retroactively in that jurisdiction.176 The Eleventh Circuit also found that Miller was only a procedural rule and, therefore, not retroactive on collateral
review.177 Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota declined to apply Miller retroactively,
following the Teague analysis for the same reasons cited above.178 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also determined
the rule was procedural.179 The Virginia court noted that the Supreme Court
of the United States specifically distinguished Miller from Graham because
Graham instituted a categorical bar whereas Miller affected the sentencing
process.180

170. Paula Purpura, Louisiana Supreme Court Hears Argument on Parole for Juvenile
Killers, NOLA.com, (Sept. 4, 2013, 6:20 PM) http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/09/
louisiana_supreme_court_hears.html.
171. State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 844 (La. 2013).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 838.
174. Id. at 839–41.
175. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2013); Martin v. Symmes,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965, at *51 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013); Johnson v. Ponton, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021, at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013); Falcon v. State, 111 So. 3d 973,
973 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
176. See generally Falcon, 111 So. 3d at 973; Johnson v. State, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS
6821, at *2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
177. Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1368. The Eleventh Circuit relies on authority that indicates
that a rule becomes retroactive only when the Supreme Court so holds, but the court fails to
address the fact that Kuntrell Jackson’s case was brought on collateral review. Id. at 1367–68.
178. Martin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147965 at *50-51; Chambers v. Minnesota, 831
N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn. 2013).
179. Ponton, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149021 at *16.
180. Id. at *17. Notably, the court recognizes that just because the Supreme Court applied
the rule to Jackson’s case that it will not be applied retroactively in all cases. Id. at *13–14
(citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010), in which the Court created a new
rule, which was brought on collateral review, but later announced in a separate opinion that it
would not be applied retroactively).
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These cases generally rely on the same proposition: Miller is limited to
a procedural rule of law and does not fit into either of the Teague exceptions.181 Based on the analysis behind Miller, Graham, and Roper—that kids
are different from adults when it comes to sentencing182—it seems unjust to
deny those defendants whose sentences became final before Miller the opportunity afforded to Kuntrell Jackson.183 In the interest of justice, the decision made by those jurisdictions in which Miller has been retroactively applied should become the prevailing view.184
4.

Miller Merits Retroactive Application

Indeed, if ever there was a legal rule that should—as a matter of law and
morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in Miller.
To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional punishment on some persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of
justice.185

If the premise behind differentiated sentencing standards between juvenile offenders and adults is predicated on the notion that “children are
constitutionally different,”186 then, in the interest of justice, Miller v. Alabama warrants retroactive application.
Sentenced to mandatory life without parole, a juvenile offender never
has a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”187 Consider the case of Sharon Wiggins.188 Sharon
was seventeen when she was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to mandatory life without parole in Pennsylvania.189 Although Sharon’s
crime was terrible, as a child she was a victim of poverty, neglect, and
abuse, 190 factors the court was not permitted to consider because her sen181. See, e.g., id. at *20 (refusing to apply Miller retroactively).
182. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (explaining that as established
in Graham and Roper “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing”).
183. People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012) (Sterba J.,
concurring). The Teague Court specifically noted that justice required retroactive application
of a rule once applied to the defendant in the case. Id. at 1024 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 300 (1989)). Therefore, because the rule was applied to Jackson on collateral review, it follows that it is applicable to all similarly situated defendants. Id. at 1025.
184. See supra text accompanying note 183.
185. Hill v. Synder, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013).
186. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
187. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
188. In Memory of Sharon Wiggins, a Child 45 Years Ago Sentenced to Die in Prison,
JUVENILE LAW CENTER (Mar. 25, 2013) http://www.jlc.org/blog/memory-sharon-wigginschild-45-years-ago-sentenced-die-prison.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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tence was mandatory.191 Although Sharon committed a horrible crime as a
minor, Sharon was generally reformed during her time behind bars; she obtained a bachelor’s degree, over 10,000 educational certificates, and tutored
other inmates so that they were able to obtain their GEDs.192 Unfortunately,
Sharon was never given the chance to prove that she had become a better
person because she passed away in prison at the age of sixty-two.193
In jurisdictions where Miller is not retroactively applied, people like
Sharon, who have actually been reformed, will never be given the chance to
prove that they, too, have changed.194 If the mitigating circumstances of
youth that support the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller are so important
for juvenile offenders today,195 then they should not be any less important
for juveniles that committed crimes before the decision was made.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Miller, Graham, Roper, and Thompson hinges on the fundamental differences between children and adults. The
Supreme Court explained in Miller that its decision was based in part “on
common sense—on ‘what any parent knows’” about a child’s lack of maturity and development.196 Common sense indicates that if it is “cruel and
unusual”197 to sentence a juvenile to mandatory life without parole now, it
was cruel and unusual even before these cases came up for review.
Although the Supreme Court arguably made only a procedural change
to criminal sentencing through its decision, Miller also banned a particular
sentence for a group of individuals, which satisfies the first Teague exception and merits retroactive application.198 Without retroactive application
across the board, juveniles in states like Louisiana will continue to serve an
unconstitutional sentence.199 In addition to the reasons cited by the courts
above,200 the approach the Supreme Court has taken of distinguishing children from adults in terms of sentencing supports giving these offenders an
opportunity for collateral review.

191. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (explaining that mandatory sentences inherently prevent mitigating factors from being taken into account).
192. See Wiggins, supra note 188.
193. Id.
194. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (explaining that mandatory sentences preclude the
possibility of rehabilitation).
195. Id. at 2464 n.5 (explaining that the research relied upon in Graham and Roper, to
show that children are developmentally different from adults, has gotten even stronger with
time).
196. Id. at 2464.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
198. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012).
199. See generally State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013) (holding that Miller does
not apply retroactively).
200. See infra Part III.B.2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s approach to individualized sentencing of juvenile
offenders has been based on the notion that children are fundamentally different from adults when it comes to the level of culpability for a crime.201
Although the Court has limited its decisions to those cases where a juvenile
is sentenced with society’s most severe punishments,202 its analysis supports
the conclusion that when sentencing juveniles, mitigating factors, which
make children constitutionally different from adults, should always be considered.
If the Supreme Court is going to continue with its “children are different” approach to juvenile justice, it needs to expand the holding of Miller v.
Alabama to recognize that children are different across the board. The next
steps are to prohibit all mandatory sentences of juvenile offenders and apply
the rule in Miller retroactively, so that the thousands of juvenile offenders
now serving an unconstitutional sentence will be able to make their case.
Those steps will ensure that justice is served and a child’s mitigating circumstances are taken into account, leading to a stronger society as a whole.
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